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Introduction 
    With the rise of digital technology, particularly social media, terrorist groups have gained a valuable new 
tool for furthering their goals. Terrorist propaganda, for the purposes of this brief, is defined as any video, 
picture, post, or any other form of media posted to the internet to further the cause of the terrorist 
organization, such as recruitment or communication with followers around the world. The manipulation of 
technology by non-state actors is not a new phenomenon; however, social media and other new digital 
technologies have proven a valuable resource for many terrorist organizations. Not only have terrorist 
groups been adept in using new technologies such as Twitter, Bitcoin, and small drone aircraft, but the use 
of new technologies has also fundamentally changed their methods of operation [1]. This issue leads us to 
ask how the interaction between terrorist groups and emerging digital technologies has created challenges 
in the counterterrorism landscape of the twenty-first century? In this brief, we specifically address these 
three questions: (1) how have terrorist groups used social media to further their causes, (2) how has the 
use of social media changed the operating nature of these groups, and (3) what are 





While social media platforms, such as Twitter, actively work to ban 
accounts spreading terrorist propaganda, there are accounts or 
messages that are missed. Currently, most governments rely on 
these platforms self-policing and the companies themselves are 
largely shielded from legal risk if their services are used for 
nefarious purposes. In the United States, this regulation occurs 
under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act [2]. Large 
social media companies rely primarily on automated and manual 
content moderation, done by the community and professional 
moderators.
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    In Canada [3] and the European Union [4], a 
stricter requirement is imposed that content be 
immediately removed; failure to do so can lead 
to legal action. Other methods, such as counter-
messaging, have been attempted on a small 
scale, such as the U. S. State Department’s 
“Think Again, Turn Away” program [5], but found 
limited effectiveness. The current policy 
consisting mainly of in-platform content 
moderation efforts prevents mainstream social 
media from becoming a major propaganda 
outlet, but many other channels are still 
available to terrorists on these platforms. 
 
 
Risks, Benefits, and Ethical 
Considerations 
 
    Unlike traditional methods, terrorists’ social 
media use has the potential to reach or influence 
a far larger number of people, as an estimated 
3.96 billion people use social media [6]. This 
potential audience presents a massive risk, 
leaving a huge number of people susceptible to 
radicalization. In addition to mainstream social 
media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, and 
Instagram, there are many lesser-known forms 
of social media, including the dark web. All of 
these can be dangerous when used by terrorists. 
For example, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS), used a mobile app called “Dawn of Glad 
Tidings” to not only update followers but hijack 
their twitter accounts for propaganda purposes 
[5]. All of these strategies come together to 
allow terrorist propaganda to propagate, 
increasing the likelihood that it reaches 
individuals vulnerable to radicalization, who may 
then support the terrorist cause. Additionally, 
there is risk of the terrorist message becoming 
normalized, granting the group additional 
legitimacy. 
    While dangers of social media are often 
discussed, it has numerous benefits to society in 
its relatively short existence. There may be a 
temptation to eliminate or restrict it heavily but 
would be counterproductive and remove many 
of the benefits, discussed below. A social media 
benefit is that it has enabled almost every person 
to connect with a wider range of people. This 
connection has manifested in the formation of 
communities enjoyed by millions, built around 
common interests, from television series to 
astrophysics, which has positive effects on 
mental health [7]. Additionally, it has 
empowered small businesses by reducing the 
cost of targeted advertising [8] and provided 
individuals with ways to accelerate their careers 
through sites like LinkedIn. 
    Content moderation on social media also 
comes with unique ethical considerations. The 
most discussed is large companies’ power to 
restrict individual access to the global exchange 
taking place on social media. It can often be 
necessary for companies to take action when 
dangerous content is being spread. Many people 
do not trust for-profit corporations to police 
speech, particularly regarding domestic matters; 
between July 2020 and January 2021 Twitter 
banned 70,000 accounts affiliated with “QAnon” 
[9]. “QAnon” is a collection of conspiracy 
theories holding, among other things, that 
former President Trump was battling a secret 
group of elites who control the U.S. government. 
This situation was further complicated when 
former President Trump was banned from 
Twitter after the attack on the U.S. Capitol on 
January 6, 2021. This action raises concerns 
about who has the power to deny social media 











     Any response to the use of social media by 
terrorists carries with it a set of costs. These 
costs can come in many forms, such as societal, 
financial, and political. A policy which is more lax 
on this issue would incur costs associated with 
the increased success of terrorist propaganda. 
This “success” includes financial costs for 
security from this new threat, societal cost in the 
form of exposing civilians to radicalization, and 
political cost in the form of the government 
appearing weak. Being too aggressive entails 
risks of its own, however. One concern intrinsic 
to the regulation of speech, particularly of 
citizens, is that of government overreach and the 
formation of a “big-brother” or “police” state. In 
addition to content moderation being fairly 
expensive [10], free speech and expression is a 
cornerstone of Western identity. Governments, 
such as China’s, have implemented expansive 
social monitoring programs that make it far 
easier to regulate the behavior of its citizens, but 
this is often not done in good faith [11]. 
Programs monitoring civilians have faced strong 
criticism in the U.S., and it is likely that any 
expansion in surveillance would prompt 
widespread repercussions, which is a huge 
political cost to consider. 
 
Policy Alternatives and 
Recommendations 
  
    As previously discussed, stopping terrorist 
propaganda online is very difficult. Of the 4.2 
billion social media accounts in the world [12], it 
is practically impossible to monitor every 
account, view every post, and watch every video 
on social media. The United States government 
understands this is a daunting task. Additionally, 
the government is also required to respect the 
First Amendment and free speech, and the 
values embodied therein. One alternative to the 
current policy is to increase the accountability of 
social media companies. For example, there is 
some discussion that social media companies 
should be charged with Aiding and Abetting with 
regards to terrorist propaganda online, if they 
allow it to be spread on their platforms.  
    Essentially, this means that, in addition to the 
Communications Decency Act, social media 
companies could be held responsible for 
assisting terrorist groups to spread violent 
messages if companies are found to be aiding 
this behavior, including through intentional 
negligence. While it could be difficult to prove 
that companies knew about certain content, it 
stiffens the penalty that companies could incur, 
which would provide a stronger incentive to 
police content on their platforms. 
 
“Imposing responsibility on social media 
companies punishes their hesitation to 
self-censor and the facilitation of terrorist 
activity which follows. Aiding and abetting 
provides the best conduit for implementing 
liability against social media companies 
because it focuses on the “facilitation” role 
their lack of self-censorship plays in the 
promotion of (terrorist content)…In 
essence, holding social media companies 
responsible through aiding and abetting 
would copy the changes made in the U.S. 




    The danger posed by terrorists using social 
media to augment their capabilities is clear. 
While the United States and other Western 
nations have been somewhat successful in 
combating the spread of dangerous online 
content, there is still much work to be done. As 
laid out in this brief, the solution to this problem 
must be nuanced enough to remove dangerous 




content while respecting the civil liberties that 
have become core to Western identity. This 
solution likely has elements of increased 
regulation and accountability for the providers 
of these novel digital services. Additionally, a 
solution also involves elements of increased use 
of these same technologies against terrorist 
groups. In successfully implementing improved 
policy to match the dangers posed by social 
media there are clear benefits to a nation’s 
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